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Abstract: Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. 
Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, 
or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential 
connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid 
measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives 
to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of 
awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the 
degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different 
perspective. Confidence ratings may offer important advantages over 
subjective visibility ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported 
by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we 
do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We 
recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental 
designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address 
a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that 







There is an obvious connection between feelings of confidence and the subjective 
experience of consciously perceiving something. When consciously perceiving 
something, one typically is at least somewhat confident about what that perceptual 
experience is about. Alternatively, when one doesn’t have a conscious experience of 
something—even if one correctly perceives it unconsciously—one typically does not 
have a sense of confidence about what the perception is about. This link has often 
been used to justify the use of confidence ratings as an indirect measure of subjects’ 
conscious awareness in perceptual tasks.1 
 
Recently, Rosenthal (2019) discusses in depth these potential connections between 
confidence and consciousness but he ultimately rejects confidence as a useful, and in 
some cases even valid, measure of consciousness. Instead, he argues there are better 
alternatives to get at conscious experiences, such as direct subjective reports of 
awareness (i.e. subjects’ sincere reports of perceiving something or of the degree of 
visibility of a stimulus).2 Rosenthal concludes that “there can be little to favor 
confidence over subjective report as a measure of consciousness” (Rosenthal 2019, 
264). 
 
We agree with much of Rosenthal’s analysis and we too share some of his concerns. 
In fact, we have also urged researchers to not equate confidence or metacognition with 
subjective experience (Fleming and Lau 2014; Maniscalco and Lau 2012; Morales, 
Odegaard, and Maniscalco 2019). Nevertheless, confidence may in fact offer a valuable 
window into consciousness. Metacognitive measures such as confidence ratings may 
offer important advantages over subjective ratings.  
 
 
                                               
1 Most of our analysis is limited to visual experiences.  
2 In the literature, the terms “subjective reports” or “subjective ratings” sometimes include confidence 




2. Advantages in Using Confidence Ratings 
 
To study consciousness in the laboratory, subjects typically perform a primary 
perceptual task (type I) and then provide a subjective judgment (type II) on that 
primary task. For instance, if asked to detect whether a stimulus was briefly presented 
on a screen or not, subjects’ primary task is to respond “present” or “absent” (normally 
by pressing a key). Then, subjects may be asked to provide a subjective report about the 
visibility of the stimulus during the type I task. For example, they may be asked to 
respond “seen” or “guess”. The answers may also be more fine-grained, as in the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) (Ramsøy and Overgaard 2004), which introduces 
four levels or degrees of awareness: (0) No experience, (1) Brief glimpse, (2) Almost 
clear experience, and (3) Clear experience. These kinds of subjective reports are 
commonly used in consciousness research and they are meant to be direct reports of 
subjects’ experience in each experimental trial. Alternatively, instead of providing a 
subjective report, subjects may make a confidence judgment in the correctness of their type 
I response. This is typically done by pressing a key that maps onto some scale that 
tracks different levels of confidence (e.g. low vs high confidence, or a 4-point scale 
that goes from “no confidence” to “certain”, etc.). 
 
The central advantage of using confidence ratings over subjective ratings of visibility 
is their ease of clear definition and instruction. Unlike subjective reports, confidence 
can be clearly defined as the subjective probability of being correct in the primary task 
(Norman and Price, 2015). This definition allows experimenters to treat subjective 
confidence ratings as a somewhat objective measure of metacognitive sensitivity. That 
is, subjective reports of visibility are about subjective experiences, which are 
inaccessible to the experimenter. However, when using confidence ratings, there is a 
truth of the matter: subjects’ confidence ratings either predict or not the correctness 
of their type I responses, thus objectively tying confidence ratings to task performance. 
This relationship can be used to estimate subjects’ metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming and 
Lau 2014). For instance, an ideal observer would rate accurate responses in the primary 
task with high confidence and inaccurate responses with low confidence. These 
confidence ratings are objectively correct. In contrast, a low confidence rating after a 
correct response or a high confidence rating after an incorrect response are objectively 
incorrect. Subjects’ metacognitive behavior can be compared against this ideal to 
measure their metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming 2017; Galvin et al. 2003; Maniscalco 
and Lau 2016). 
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Relatedly, an advantage of the objectivity of confidence ratings is that subjects can 
receive feedback on their metacognitive performance, and thus can be trained to 
improve the accuracy of their confidence ratings (Carpenter et al. 2019). Animals can 
also be trained to rate confidence, even though verbal instruction is not possible (Kiani 
and Shadlen 2009; Kornell, Son, and Terrace 2007; Smith, Shields, and Washburn 
2003; Smith, Couchman, and Beran 2014)(Kiani & Shadlen 2009; Kornell et al. 2007; 
Smith et al. 2003, 2014). All this is relatively difficult if not impossible to achieve with 
subjective reports of conscious awareness. 
 
Perhaps the most important benefit provided by the clear definition and instruction 
of confidence ratings is that they can remove a significant amount of measurement 
noise. When using subjective reports, participants may interpret quite differently what 
“seeing something” or “not seeing anything” means. This reflects the so-called criterion 
content problem (Kahneman 1968). Subjective reports about a stimulus necessarily are 
the result of certain unspecified criteria of what to focus on when reporting back the 
experience. Put simply, what counts as “seeing something” or “not seeing anything” 
is often not clear to subjects, and the criterion of what counts as such may change 
across subjects or across trials for the same subject.  
 
This problem arises even when using prima facie clearly defined scales for subjective 
reports of visibility, such as the PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard 2004). Even though it 
provides labels for each of the levels of the scale, the PAS is not without problems 
(Michel 2019). For example, the PAS cannot provide any guidance as to what criterion 
to use for choosing each level. Does a “brief glimpse” mean being aware of anything at 
all or of some meaningful feature of the stimulus? Having a vague experience of something 
being present on the screen versus having a vague experience of a left-tilted grating 
being on the screen are quite different, and yet the scale itself does not constrain a 
consistent usage. (This is true even if experimenters try to specify what each scale is 
supposed to mean.) One subject might interpret a vague experience of an unspecified 
content as “no experience” and another might interpret it as a “brief glimpse”. In most 
experiments that probe conscious awareness, stimuli are at threshold or somehow 
degraded (e.g. low contrast, fast presentation, masking, distracted attention, etc.). 
Under these conditions, subjects may still see something. The option “no awareness” 
may be too strong and it may be interpreted very differently by different subjects, in 
different tasks. In an odd sense, one always ‘sees’ something, even with one’s eyes 
closed (“seeing darkness”?). This sense of understanding seeing may be odd, but some 
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subjects may well hear it that way. When we study a large group of people these 
problems do occur, and the use of subjective reports leaves open the door for these 
odd or inconsistent behaviors. 
 
In stark contrast, confidence can be expressed on a well-calibrated and meaningful 
scale.3 Probability in terms of percentage likelihood is comparable and equally 
applicable across different tasks (e.g. detection, discrimination, recognition, etc.). 
Defined this way (instead of on an arbitrary scale, e.g. high vs low), confidence 
judgments can reflect the subjective probability of one’s being correct in a task, no 
matter the nature of the task. That is, the questions “how confident are you?” or “how 
likely are you to be correct?” remain the same for different types of tasks. This has 
allowed for comparisons of type II behavior between perceptual domains that have 
very different phenomenologies (Rouault et al. 2018), such as different perceptual 
modalities (de Gardelle, Le Corre, and Mamassian 2016; Faivre et al. 2017), or between 
domains such as visual perception and memory (Fitzgerald, Arvaneh, and Dockree 
2017; McCurdy et al. 2013; Morales, Lau, and Fleming 2018). Even transferring 
metacognitive sensitivity training from one domain to another is possible (Carpenter 
et al. 2019). In contrast, subjective ratings are most applicable to single stimulus 
detection (and perhaps discrimination), and the response options obviously need to 
be modified depending on the nature of the task and the stimuli involved (e.g. 
comparing two sets of different stimuli, detecting if something has changed or is 
missing, etc.). 
 
Last but not least, one often neglected consideration is socio-strategic. The study of 
confidence and metacognition is a burgeoning field within mainstream cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. There is rigorous work on both computational 
(Fleming and Daw 2017; van den Berg et al. 2016)  and psychophysical modeling 
(Fleming 2017; Maniscalco and Lau 2016), as well as neuronal electrophysiology (Kiani 
and Shadlen 2009; Miyamoto et al. 2017; Stolyarova et al. 2019; Miyamoto et al. 2018). 
. There is hardly any such equivalence for the study of ‘subjective visibility’. This has 
little to do with substantive theoretical considerations, but it is no less important. To 
the extent that the two kinds of measures are similar in most cases, as we will argue in 
                                               
3 This, of course, does not mean that subjects cannot be biased (e.g. under- or overconfident) in how 
they use confidence ratings. However, the meaning of each level (i.e. the probability of being correct) 
is well-defined, even if thinking about subjective probabilities is hard or if mapping subjective 
probabilities onto a specific scale could create some noise.  
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section 4, such consideration becomes relevant. Science is very much a social activity. 
The standards of rigor, funding and job availability matter, and they largely depend on 
which peer groups one belongs to. And this matters not just in terms of personal 
benefit but also for the longevity and development of the field. Making the scientific 
study of consciousness relevant to the study of confidence and metacognition is 
strategically appealing. 
 
3.  Problems with Confidence Ratings 
 
The advantages discussed in the previous section are, however, not decisive by 
themselves. They have to be weighed up against other factors, such as potential caveats 
about the use of confidence ratings. 
 
One such caveat raised by Rosenthal (2019) concerns the possibility of enjoying 
conscious experiences without confidence. This is the case in peripheral vision. One 
may not be confident of what one is seeing in the periphery of the field of vision, and 
yet enjoy a distinct conscious experience of seeing something. We basically agree with 
this description of the phenomenology. However, it is important to distinguish 
between detection (Is there something?) and discrimination (What is it? Is it A or B?). 
Our discriminative ability is relatively poor outside of the focus of attention (Braun et 
al. 1999) (Braun et al. 1999). Accordingly, it is not surprising to have low confidence 
judgments of discrimination in the periphery. In fact, optimal metacognizers are 
expected to rate their discriminations in the periphery with low confidence. In 
contrast, detection in the periphery is known to be liberal (i.e. subjects tend to report 
often that they detected something) (M. K. Li, Lau, and Odegaard 2018; Odegaard et 
al. 2018; Solovey, Graney, and Lau 2015). Thus, when confidence concerns detection 
rather than discrimination, subjects are more likely to be confident after seeing 
something in the periphery. On these trials, they are likely to judge that they are fairly 
sure that they see something (confidence for detection), even if they are unsure of 
what they see (confidence for discrimination). So, Rosenthal’s suggestion that there is 
a dissociation between confidence and subjective experience in the periphery should 
be limited to some kinds of tasks only. For confidence ratings during detection tasks, 
confidence and awareness seem to go hand in hand.  
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Another possible dissociation between consciousness and confidence is when 
confidence is not based on a subjective perceptual experience. Rosenthal discusses the 
somewhat complicated case of type II blindsight. Blindsight is a condition in which 
patients with a lesion in the visual cortex deny being consciously aware of stimuli 
presented in a specific region of their visual field. In type II blindsight, blindsight 
patients claim to “feel” some change within their blindfield (e.g. movement) but they 
also insist they know this not because of having a normal visual experience (i.e. they 
just “feel” it)  (Brogaard 2014; Foley and Kentridge 2015; Foley 2015; Macpherson 
2015). Rosenthal takes blindsight patients’ denial of having a normal visual experience 
as evidence that their “nonvisual awareness is not perceptual in any way; it is best seen 
as a type of cognition” (2019, 262). While it seems clear that blindsight patient’s 
experience is not normal (e.g. it doesn’t feel the same way as their normal visual field), 
this need not entail it is not visual (e.g. presumably, if they closed their eyes the 
“feeling” would go away). Even conceding type II blindsight does not entail that 
patients enjoy visual experiences, it is not clear that we should thereby infer they are 
not reporting a conscious experience. And if they do and they base their confidence 
on this subjective conscious experience (even if it is not visual), the connection 
between confidence and consciousness might still survive—or at least it would not be 
imperiled to the degree and for the reasons suggested by Rosenthal.  
 
Type II blindsight, however, is a complex case, ultimately difficult to analyze. Perhaps 
a much simpler scenario can highlight Rosenthal’s worries about confidence being 
disconnected from conscious experiences without the vicissitudes of type II blindsight. 
Consider a situation in which subjects have fixed their confidence in an experimental 
trial before even seeing the stimulus. This may happen via cognitive deduction, for 
example, when subjects know the base rate of the stimuli (e.g. that 70% of the stimuli 
are As rather than Bs). Before seeing the stimulus, because of their knowledge of the 
frequency of stimuli in that task, subjects may express high confidence in their answers 
independently from the quality of their conscious experiences. At the limit, subjects 
could become highly confident in their responses even if they don’t see anything. For 
example, if they closed their eyes but knew that 70% of stimuli are of type A, when 
classifying the stimulus in a trial as ‘A’ they might express high confidence in the 
correctness of their response. This, of course, would clearly be a case where confidence 
is detached from consciousness.  
 
This second form of dissociation could become a real problem, and is in part why we 
too recommend researchers not to equate consciousness with confidence (Fleming 
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and Lau 2014; Maniscalco and Lau 2012; Morales, Odegaard, and Maniscalco 2019). 
However, the fact that this kind of dissociation can take place does not entail that 
confidence is not, in general, a good indicator of consciousness. The degree to which 
confidence reflects subjective experience ultimately depends on the degree to which 
confidence is exhaustively driven by conscious perceptual information. Thus, to the 
extent that we can rule out non-perceptual sources of confidence, confidence does 
track subjective experience very closely.  
 
4. Similarity between Confidence and Subjective 
Ratings 
 
Despite the advantages of using confidence over subjective reports of awareness 
(section 2) and the aforementioned dissociations between the two (section 3), in 
practice they produce very similar experimental results. These important, yet 
theoretical differences, do not appear to be significant enough to produce behavioral 
differences in the laboratory—at least not with our current methods. 
 
Behaviorally, visibility and confidence ratings seem to produce similar results. For 
example, Peters & Lau (Peters and Lau 2015) obtained qualitatively identical results in 
a masking experiment regardless of whether they asked subjects to rate their 
confidence or to judge the visibility of the stimuli. Even researchers who have found 
(rather small) differences between subjective reports and confidence ratings in 
conditions of very low contrast (e.g. Rausch and Zehetleitner 2016; Zehetleitner and 
Rausch 2013) admit that “there was a considerable association between the two ratings 
that were required after each trial, indicating that the patterns of the ratings are quite 
similar” (Zehetleitner and Rausch 2013, 1423). 
 
But a stronger point can be made about the close connection between confidence 
ratings and subjective reports. The underlying neural dynamics and neural mechanisms 
supporting different types of subjective reflection on one’s experience largely overlap. 
First, certain features of the brain’s global dynamics affect visibility and confidence 
ratings in a similar way. Spontaneous low frequency brain oscillations (<30 Hz) affect 
(or perhaps reflect) neuronal excitability and, with it, performance and type II ratings 
during psychophysical tasks (Samaha et al. 2020). In particular, two recent studies 
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found that low frequency oscillations with lower prestimulus power (i.e. oscillations of 
lower magnitude right before the presentation of a stimulus) biased observers to report 
both higher confidence and higher subjective visibility (Benwell et al. 2017; Samaha, 
Iemi, and Postle 2017). Second, despite stark task differences and radically different 
ways of probing consciousness, many studies using different types of neuroimaging 
techniques across different species have consistently found astonishingly similar neural 
correlates of consciousness. Prefrontal cortex (PFC) (often very specific areas in 
dorsolateral and orbitofrontal PFC) has been found to support subjective reports of 
awareness (Del Cul et al. 2009; Lau and Passingham 2006), visibility ratings (Rounis et 
al. 2010) and confidence ratings alike [in both animals (Mendoza-Halliday and 
Martinez-Trujillo 2017) and humans (Cortese et al. 2016; Fleming, Huijgen, and Dolan 
2012; Morales, Lau, and Fleming 2018)]. Importantly, these findings likely reflect the 
underlying perceptual experience rather than the mere act of reporting it (Michel and 
Morales 2020).  
 
Despite these widespread similarities, Rosenthal cites research showing that subjective 
reports and confidence ratings have different neural activity profiles. In particular, he 
appeals to a study by Li et al. (2014) to argue that we have reasons “to expect that 
confidence ratings and subjective awareness likely reflect different psychological 
processes, at least to some extent” (Rosenthal 2019, 259). This, however, should not 
matter for using confidence as a proxy for consciousness. Even if they are different 
psychological processes to some extent—as we admit they are—we can use one to learn 
about the other (see section 5). We dispute, however, that Li at colleagues’ results 
support defending a significant difference between the neural profiles of subjective 
reports and confidence ratings or, more importantly, a difference that is significant for 
the study of consciousness. Our reasons are somewhat technical, but we think they are 
worth reviewing because of their ultimate importance for the neuroscientific study of 
consciousness in general. 
 
In Li et al.’s study, subjects saw Gabor patches oriented to the left or to the right in 
each trial. They had to answer three sequential questions: (1) Was the Gabor patch 
pointing left or right? (2) Did you see the stimulus or not? (3) How confident are you 
about your answer to question (2)? Subjects’ magnetoencephalographic (MEG) 
activity was recorded throughout the experiment. MEG activity correlated with 
subjective awareness (i.e. the answer to question 2) peaked between .5 and 1.5 seconds 
after stimulus offset and it covered widespread frontoparietal and temporal areas. In 
contrast, MEG activity correlated with confidence ratings (i.e. the answer to question 
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3) peaked at .5 seconds in frontoparietal areas and dissipated shortly after. Li and 
colleagues concluded that compared with subjective awareness, confidence is 
associated with relatively transient MEG activity. 
 
First, we should point out that Li et al.’s results confirm the frontal localization shared 
by subjective reports and confidence ratings we discussed above. However, it is 
important to note that subjects were asked to answer a non-standard confidence 
question. In most experiments using confidence ratings subjects are asked to rate their 
confidence in their type I decision. Li et al., in contrast, asked subjects to evaluate their 
confidence in their subjective report (a type II evaluation of a type II question). While 
this may be an interesting and valid approach, the peculiarity of the procedure makes 
comparisons with other studies hard to evaluate.  
 
More problematically, the alleged difference in the MEG profile of subjective reports 
and confidence ratings is hard to evaluate because the underlying analysis suffers from 
an important confound: task performance is not matched between aware and unaware 
conditions. A crucial step when comparing aware vs unaware (or high vs low 
confidence) neural data is to ensure performance in the main task is matched; 
otherwise, instead of comparing the neural correlates of consciousness one risks just 
detecting differences in perceptual processing (Lau 2008; Morales, Odegaard, and 
Maniscalco 2019). While perhaps tempting, one cannot attempt to match performance 
“artificially” by simply analyzing the correct trials of the two conditions of interest 
(Morales, Chiang, and Lau 2015). It may appear as a tempting solution because one 
could think that correct aware and correct unaware trials have a matched performance 
(100% accuracy for both!). But, crucially, the perceptual signal that gives rise to correct 
aware trials is most certainly stronger than the perceptual signal that allows for a 
correct answer in an unaware trial. In the former, the internal perceptual response is 
more likely to be high; in the latter, however, the internal perceptual response is likely 
to be low. This entails that a larger proportion of unaware correct answers is the 
product of chance rather than perceptual discrimination (even when you don’t see the 
stimulus, you have a 50/50 chance of guessing correctly the answer in the main task). 
Despite these known problems surrounding performance-matching corrections, the 
analyses in Li et al. (2014; their figure 2C) incorporate comparisons between aware 
correct vs unaware correct MEG activity. This kind of comparison that overlooks true 
performance (and in consequence internal response) obscures the underlying nature 
of aware and unaware neural activity. Thus, comparing these results to those pertaining 
to confidence becomes extremely difficult—and potentially invalid. 
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The overwhelming behavioral and neural similarity between subjective reports and 
confidence ratings should not be particularly surprising. After all, they are both 
subjective assessments and in the case of confidence ratings, they are likely to be driven 
to a large extent by conscious experiences themselves (see section 5). In fact, they are 
so similar that many of Rosenthal’s criticisms against confidence ratings apply almost 
equally to subjective reports of awareness as well. For example, consider his argument 
against using confidence ratings because they offer no benefit over subjective reports 
in cases of complete lack of confidence. “For confidence to be a useful indicator of 
consciousness, subjects would have to distinguish total lack of confidence from very 
slight confidence,” Rosenthal thinks. “It is unlikely that subjects would be more 
accurate in drawing that distinction than in distinguishing minimal awareness from 
complete absence of awareness.” (Rosenthal 2019, 258) We agree that subjects are 
asked to make this distinction; especially in detection experiments where subjects have 
to evaluate their confidence in whether they saw something at all or not. But at least 
some confidence rating scales have a “guess” option at the lower end (Dienes et al. 
1995; Dienes and Seth 2010; Wierzchoń, Asanowicz, and Paulewicz 2012).4 Forcing 
subjects to distinguish a complete absence of confidence (i.e. full guessing) from a 
minimal degree of confidence should be possible with these scales, satisfying 
Rosenthal’s demand. And even though scales with “guess” or “no confidence” options 
have been deemed problematic (Norman and Price, 2015), very similar criticisms about 
the interpretability of this option have been raised against subjective reports too 
(Michel 2019). Moreover, even if Rosenthal were right that using confidence ratings 
cannot make subjects more accurate (but see the arguments from section 2), it is not 
clear that using confidence ratings would make subjects less accurate. As he admits, 
“subjective reports can be biased [...] and may not always reflect subjective awareness 
with total accuracy” (Rosenthal 2019, 258). In fact, the presence of response biases in 
subjective reports of awareness may be problematic (Phillips 2016) and may even be 
unavoidable (Peters, Ro, and Lau 2016).  
 
In the end, we think that the advantages of using confidence over subjective reports, 
in addition to their strong similarities and very small and subtle differences, should 
favor the use of confidence ratings. But we do not advocate this as a strict dogma. If 
a specific situation indicates confidence may be problematic (e.g. prior knowledge may 
                                               
4 Even though these scales have been used in assessing awareness of artificial grammars, nothing 
prevents us from using them in visual tasks.  
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affect the results, the subject population have self-esteem traits that might unduly 
inflate or deflate confidence ratings, etc.), then we do not discourage the use of 
subjective reports (e.g. PAS or some other scale). After all, many of the benefits and 
problems of confidence and subjective reports are similar. The decision to use one or 
another scale is mostly methodological: depending on the specific design and goal of 
a study, using confidence ratings might not be the best course of action for that 
particular case. However, this does not make confidence less desirable as a tool for 
studying consciousness and, as we’ve argued above, confidence is preferable over 
subjective reports in a vast number of cases.  
 
5. Quality Space Theory and Confidence 
 
We now turn to a more conceptual question: what is the link between consciousness 
and confidence? In other words, why does confidence seem to reflect consciousness, 
at least most of the time?  
 
Philosophers and scientists alike often claim that there are associations between 
consciousness and cognitive functions, e.g. one needs to be consciously aware of 
certain information to exercise cognitive control over it, initiate voluntary action, 
exercise rational thought, and display flexible behavior  (Dehaene et al. 2014; Tye 
1996). These claims, however, are also sometimes challenged on both empirical 
(Koizumi, Maniscalco, and Lau 2015; Lau and Passingham 2007; van Gaal et al. 2008; 
van Gaal, de Lange, and Cohen 2012) and philosophical (Robinson, Maley, and 
Piccinini 2015) grounds. More generally, there is a serious technical challenge 
experimenters face when studying the functions of consciousness. As noted in the 
previous section, a problem that is hard to overcome is that perceptual signals are 
often confounded with consciousness. In the typical case, strong perceptual signals are 
correlated with conscious perception and weak perceptual signals are correlated with 
unconscious perception. With stronger perceptual signals more cognitive functions are 
trivially expected to be exercised (Block 2019; Phillips and Morales 2020). Thus, 
without properly matching perceptual signals (e.g. by matching task performance), 
simply looking at the functions of consciousness that are lost during unconscious 




It may be tempting to think that consciousness and confidence (metacognition in 
particular) may be similarly confounded. Recall that here, by metacognition we 
understand one’s ability to rate confidence meaningfully (i.e. to rate confidence in a 
way that closely tracks one’s performance in a given task). Is it possible that 
consciousness’s link to metacognition is just as tenuous as its link to other higher 
cognitive functions? Rosenthal thinks this is the case. According to him, although 
confidence has considerable utility (e.g. it informs rational decision making), a 
psychological state’s being conscious does not add any utility to the state (Rosenthal 
2012; Rosenthal 2008). Therefore, consciousness and confidence cannot be linked in 
any strong sense (Rosenthal 2019).  
 
There may be, however, a more substantive link between consciousness and 
metacognition than Rosenthal allows. In fact, a variation of Rosenthal’s own higher-
order thought theory and mental quality space theory might provide important clues 
into this link. In a nutshell, we will argue that without consciousness one should not 
expect to do metacognition nearly as well. In other words, consciousness does inform 
our confidence judgments in a significant way.  
 
According to quality space theory, “mental qualities are properties of states in virtue 
of which an organism responds to a range of perceptible properties” (Rosenthal 2005, 
202). Mental qualities are defined “by their position in a quality space that’s 
homomorphic to the quality space of the perceptible properties accessible to that 
modality” (idem). This entails that an organism’s quality space is entirely determined by 
the most fine-grained discriminations it can make. To find out the limit of an 
organism’s discrimination ability, one can test experimentally for just noticeable 
differences (JNDs). For example, in the case of color, one would use color stimuli that 
are so close physically that they would be perceptually indistinguishable if they were 
any closer. Importantly, to discriminate these stimuli from one another, the organism 
must be able to be in psychological states that differ correspondingly. This is how a 
homomorphism between stimulus properties and mental qualities is obtained. The 
quality space “that represents the stimuli an individual can discriminate will also 
represent the similarities and differences among the perceptual states in virtue of which 
such discriminations are possible for that individual” (Rosenthal 2015, 38). 
Importantly, according to Rosenthal, the psychological states that make these 
discriminations possible need not be conscious.  
 
 14 
Now, consider the following toy example in which we try to characterize the mental 
quality space of single numerical digits, namely, a quality space of the visual similarities 
and differences between Arabic numerals. By running multiple pairwise 
discriminations between the digits, we can work out subjects’ digit discrimination 
ability in terms of JNDs. Thus, we can put subjects’ digit mental qualities on a quality 
space, such that the pairwise distance between the digits reflects their discriminability 
in JND units. Accordingly, ‘3’ and ‘5’ may be relatively close because they are 
somewhat more easily confused with each other. The distance in the quality space 
between ‘3’ and ‘5’, then, will be smaller compared to the distance of either of them to 
‘1’, because it’s harder to confuse them with ‘1’. In contrast, ‘1’ and ‘7’ will be close to 
each other, and more distant from ‘3’ and ‘5’, because it is harder to discriminate 1’s 
from 7’s. The mental quality of each percept is defined by its position on this quality 
space.  
 
According to higher-order thought theory, when one sees a stimulus consciously—via 
a suitable higher-order thought that represents the first-order perceptual state that 
represents the stimulus—one also becomes aware of the stimulus’s quality (Rosenthal 
2005). In Rosenthal’s view (personal communication), the subjects do not necessarily 
have an explicit grasp of the detailed mental quality space. In other words, higher-
order thoughts do not need to explicitly represent the percept’s precise position on 
the mental quality space as such. 
 
Let us assume for a moment, however, that in virtue of being conscious of the qualities 
of our percepts we knew their relative positions on the mental quality space. This 
would clearly be a useful piece of knowledge to possess. Imagine we ask you to name 
a digit that was quickly presented on a screen. If we told you that your initial answer 
of, say, ‘5’ is wrong, in your second try you may well be more likely to say ‘3’ than ‘1’. 
But this will be because you know which stimuli are fewer JNDs away from your initial 
answer than others. Similarly, in a two-choice discrimination, if we ask you whether 
the digit was ‘5’ or ‘3’, you may say ‘5’ with limited confidence. But if the question was 
whether the digit was ‘5’ or ‘1’, you may choose ‘5’ with a much higher confidence. 
Importantly, you make these confidence judgments based on your grasp of the 
distance in quality space between the two candidate digits.  
 
It is possible that a subject with no awareness of the positions of these qualities on the 
mental quality space could adopt a similar strategy based on a space of the physical 
similarity between the stimuli. But it is not clear if ordinary, untrained subjects would 
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do that. Whereas in conscious perception one seems to just make these metacognitive 
judgements without any such explicit strategy of searching through a space. Notably, 
if a subject made these discriminations based on their awareness of their percepts’ 
positions on the mental quality space rather than on a physical similarity space, we 
should expect their metacognitive performance to be superior. This is so because, as 
explained above, mental quality spaces are determined by one’s very own perceptual 
abilities. In this sense, knowing the position of a percept on one’s quality space is 
already a kind of self-knowledge that can be leveraged by metacognition. 
 
Even though Rosenthal does not think we have an explicit grasp of the mental quality 
space in detail, in his view, higher-order thoughts may conceptualize the contents of 
first-order states in terms of the quality space positions in a relatively coarse-grained 
manner. For instance, “for colors broadly taxonomized, we all recognize that orange 
is closer, at least in respect of hue, to both red and yellow than it is to either green or 
blue. [...] These broad-stroked similarity relations allow one to construct a relatively 
coarse-grained space of colors [...] which capture these relations of similarity and 
difference” (Rosenthal 2015, 37). But this coarse-grained knowledge allows us to 
know, even if just roughly, the percept’s relative position on the mental quality space. 
And this is consistent with the fact that metacognition usually isn’t perfect: we might 
not know exactly or with infinite fineness of grain the percept’s position on the mental 
quality space. However, without awareness, we should expect metacognition to be 
even worse (barring the kind of non-trivial, indirect strategy using a physical similar 
space mentioned above).  
 
This kind of metacognitive benefit from consciousness can be confirmed in blindsight 
patients. Persaud and colleagues (Persaud et al. 2011) tested blindsight patient GY’s 
metacognitive ability in both his blind and his normal hemifields. Stimuli were titrated 
to ensure that performance was matched in both his normal and blind hemifields. 
After providing a first-order response about the position on the screen of a target 
stimulus, GY could choose to get paid either via a coin flip (i.e. he had a 50/50 chance 
to earn/lose 50 cents regardless of his performance) or he could choose to be paid 
based on the correctness of his response (he would earn 50 cents if his response was 
correct and he would lose the same amount if it was not). This “no loss” post-decision 
wagering system (Dienes and Seth 2010; Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey 2007) 
essentially tracked GY’s confidence in his own response. Although GY was not 
metacognitively “blind” in his blind hemifield (i.e. his wagers tracked to some extent 
his correct/incorrect responses), it was far inferior than his metacognitive sensitivity 
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in his normal hemifield. In other words, consciousness seems to come with some 
added utility: it improves metacognition.  
 
This case suggests that higher-order representations may actually code positional 
information with respect to the mental quality space in a much more fine-grained way 
than Rosenthal seems to allow. This would provide an account of our knowing what 
it is like to see a number ‘5’ when we consciously see it: it is a little bit like a ‘3’, but 
very much unlike a ‘1’, etc. This similarity profile with respect to all other possible 
percepts within a quality space reflects the fine-grained richness of subjective 
perception. If this is correct, conscious seeing might constitutively involve grasping 
these similarity relations and, in turn, being available for metacognition. 
 
These points do not establish that consciousness is necessary or sufficient for 
metacognition. One may know the position of a stimulus on the mental quality space 
and yet fail to make use of such information. Or one may use other strategies to make 
metacognitive confidence judgments. But here we suggest that there is a close link 
between consciousness and metacognitive mechanisms. This may explain why higher-
order awareness tends to lead to superior metacognitive performance in a non-trivial 
way. A consciousness advantage for metacognitive sensitivity emerges not just because 
conscious signals tend to be stronger. Rather, blindsight and the digit quality space 
example point towards the existence of an inherent mechanistic advantage for 
metacognition when one perceives a stimulus consciously. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We argued that the use of confidence in assessing consciousness is not theoretically 
arbitrary. While consciousness and confidence are definitely not identical, there are 
good reasons to think they are closely linked. This allows researchers interested in 
studying consciousness to use confidence ratings as reliable proxies of subjective 
ratings of consciousness. We discussed some problems with the use of confidence 
ratings, but many of these also apply to subjective ratings. One exception may be the 
case of confidence being informed by non-perceptual or prior knowledge. When such 
possibility cannot be ruled out, subjective ratings may be a good alternative. But in 




We are confident that these will not be the last words on the matter. Methodological 
questions of the kind we discussed here can be expected to be solved only in the very 
long run. But this is exactly why this kind of friendly, multidisciplinary debate is so 
valuable. We are immensely grateful to David Rosenthal for capturing the relevant 
problems and for stimulating our thoughts, like he has done on practically every other 
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